Introduction

What kind of international actor is the European Union (EU)
as an external negotiator (Nuttall 1996; Bruter 1999; Nugent 2001: 297-323 ).
However, focusing on the role as an external negotiator only is misleading if one wants to understand the contribution of the Commission to European foreign policy development. It comforts the vision of an unproblematic principal-agent relationship between the Commission and the member states: member states decide to delegate certain competences to the Commission which then simply executes their will on the international scene.
2 Through a case study of external aviation relations, this article shows that one also needs to consider how the Commission is able to use its role as the guardian of the Treaties for obtaining external competences that member states have traditionally denied. 3 Extending Susanne Schmidt's (2000) analysis of
Commission activism in the integration of the internal market, the case study shows how the defense of the EU's internal aviation market has given the Commission a 3 margin to affect the default condition and the member states preferences on external relations. As the guardian of the Treaties, the Commission was able to use the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to put into question the existing framework. Parallel to a judicial strategy, the Commission pursued a cognitive and rhetorical strategy: by concentrating its efforts on the United States (US), it used the threat of American competition to construct a pan-European issue identity on aviation matters. Thus, the
Commission not only executes the member states will on the international scene, it also works independently towards increasing its external competences.
The article begins by discussing the competences of the European Commission and spelling out the argument in brief. It then turns to the case of international air
transport. An examination of the traditional aviation regime clarifies how important nation-states are in international air transport, even after the integration of the internal aviation market in the EU. In order to preserve this national logic, member states were quite opposed to transferring external negotiation rights to the European Commission.
After presenting the particular stakes of transatlantic liberalization, the analysis of the Commission's strategy for overcoming member state opposition concentrates on the Commission's legal and rhetorical toolbox, showing how it relied on ECJ rulings and refocused its activism on US relations only. The conclusion looks beyond the case study and discusses its implications.
The Commission in European foreign policies
The European Commission has a multitude of functions -from policy formulation, to administration, monitoring, mediation and external representation (see 4 Nugent 2001: 10-15; Cini 1996: 18-33) -which Dimitrakopoulos (2004: 1) divides into systemic and sub-systemic roles. Systemic roles contribute to the maintenance of the EU as a system of government and include the Commission's powers as (a) the defender of the legal order and (b) external negotiator. Sub-systemic role relate to policy-making and include drafting directives or managing their implementation.
In the context of studying the EU as an international actor, the Commission's power to represent the EU externally has been of particular interest (e.g. Nuttall 1988; , all the more since the portfolio of its competences has been rapidly expanding in recent years (Nugent and Saurugger 2002) . While the Treaty of Rome merely provided for the Commission to negotiate on behalf of the European Community in the Common Commercial Policy, the Commission now acts not only on an expanding portfolio of trade issues, but also on cooperation and association agreements; it is involved in the enlargement process at different stages; manages various parts of the EU's development and humanitarian aid programs; and negotiates on behalf of the member states on new community policies such as return of illegal migrants (see MacLeod, Hendry and Hyett 1996) .
Many accounts of the Commission's role in European foreign policy remain fairly descriptive and concentrate on the way in which it executes the growing number of external competences. Increasingly, however, analysts have drawn attention to the fact that the role of the Commission is much more complex that simply translating the member states will in foreign affairs (Cameron 2002; Cameron and Spence 2004) .
Informal rules reinforced by national diplomats and formal legal arrangements have gained in importance over the years and have seemingly moved parts of European foreign policy beyond pure intergovernmental decision-making (Smith 1998; Smith 2001 ). Indeed, looking at external competences only is insufficient for understanding 5 the part the European Commission plays in the making of foreign policies, because it obstructs an analysis of how the EU administration obtained these competences.
While most accounts of such Commission activism concentrate on intraEuropean policy domains, the Commission's behavior is comparable in external policies. Routinely, the Commission submits comments on issues outside of its competence, tries to establish links between such issues and trade relations, which are within its competence, or takes external actions on internal policies (Nugent 2001: 298; Nugent and Saurugger 2002) . 4 In the search to expand its external competences, the Commission has to rely on ECJ rulings. Of particular importance has been the increasingly expansive interpretation given by the ECJ to the principle of parallelism, whereby the existence of internal policy competences justifies parallel external powers (Nugent 2001: 298; MacLeod, Hendry and Hyett 1996) .
In order to think more systematically about these attempts to expand its external competences, it is helpful to turn to Schmidt's (2000; Commission requests and incurred the costs of domestic reform, they are themselves interested in comparable community wide-changes," (Schmidt 2000: 47) .
In the lesser evil strategy, the Commission works towards change by proposing a comprehensive reform that puts pressure on unwilling member states to propose alternatives. In the case of electricity liberalization, the Commission was able to threaten an unbalanced liberalization of the European market through its legal resources in the preparation of a more comprehensive liberalization. France, which would have preferred maintaining national monopolies, was forced to propose a counter-plan towards liberalization that was less comprehensive than the Commission would have suggested but steered clear of the unbalanced liberalization the Commission threatened. The Commission thus defined the default condition, which 7 member states had to weigh against potential changes: it was not the status quo of traditional electricity provision, but a disadvantageous form of liberalization.
In addition to the mechanisms Schmidt defines, the Commission is also an arena where ideas are exchanged (Muller 1995; Dimitrakopoulos 2004:1) . As such, it can employ a third less aggressive but useful strategy: rhetoric and cognitive framing.
Through the framing of policy-stakes in terms of pan-European goals, the Commission can work towards unity among member states objectives. 5 The tendency of the Commission to work towards consensus-building has been noted by many observers (e.g. Cini 1996: 28-32) . However, achieving consensus is a quite difficult task when the interests of member states diverge, and if they already converge, it is more helpful to speak of common interests rather than consensus-building. In the realm of foreign policy, the stakes are different. Member states might have divergent interest among each other, but they also have interests vis-à-vis countries outside the EU, which co-exist with their internal preferences. Studying the construction of a consensus within Europe is thus a way of asking how the focal point of member state negotiation got moved from internal differences to a common external interest (see Goldstein and Keohane 1993) . The rhetoric employed by the Commission can provide some useful insights into this question.
Indeed, the ability to behave as an international actor depends crucially on a collective identity or at least a collective issue identity, all the more in the European context (see Wendt 1994; Sedelmeier 2004 (Schimmelfenig 2001; Sedelmeier 2003) . Put more concretely, in a foreign policy context, the Commission can gain additional support for its goals if it can play off another international actor, against which it would be beneficial for EU member states to unite. Constructing opposition is therefore an important cognitive strategy for the EU in international affairs.
To summarize, this article draws attention to the particular tools that are available to the European Commission to affect and put pressure on decisions that the Council can take on foreign policy proposals: legal proceedings and rhetorical strategies. The following case study will highlight how the combined use of these elements has enabled the Commission to obtain limited external aviation negotiation rights, even though member states had repeatedly denied the transfer of such competences prior to June 2003.
The national logic of the bilateral system of international aviation
Understanding the position of EU member states on international air transport negotiations requires understanding the bilateral system that governs aviation. The present regime of international air transport was put into place in 1944 at the International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago. Bilaterally negotiated air service agreements constitute its foundation and represent a tight and heavy network of regulation. For the airline business, the tight network of air service agreements is decisive. To date, over 2 000 bilateral agreements have been registered; counting all informal exchanges, additions and writing, one observer has even estimated the total 9 number of bilateral agreements to be as high as 10 000. 6 The traffic rights negotiated between governments in the bilateral air service agreements cover a large number of details, including points to be served, routes to be operated, types of traffic to be carried, capacity, tariff conditions, designation of airlines as well as their ownership and control. This last item is one of the most important ones, because it requires an airline designated by a country to be effectively owned or controlled by it. In other words, the US government can only designate US carriers and the German government only German carriers. 7 Within the current framework, no airline can make seemingly simple business decisions of increasing its flight offer, targeting a new destination, soliciting foreign investment or relocating its headquarters.
This extensive international regime used to rest on the state-controlled national air transport regimes as well. Most countries maintained one or several national airlines, which were either subsidized or state-owned. Economic regulation was the rule. In the US, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) controlled entry, exit, tariffs and subsidies of airlines in the domestic markets. Since air services were thus under the exclusive control of a governmental agency, even general competition policy -i.e.
antitrust law -did not apply to the sector. Similar regulation was the standard throughout the world.
During the late1960s and early 1970s, critiques concerning the inefficiency of the regulatory system began to grow in the US. In 1978, the Airline Deregulation Act provided for a phasing out of all of the CAB's activities by 1984. The quick domestic deregulation has led to virulent re-organization of the American airline service industry. At the time, it was the first thorough dismantling of an entire system of government control.
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Eager to apply the new solutions to its own air service industry, the United Kingdom (UK) deregulated the sector in a similar manner under the Thatcher government in 1979. Both the UK and the Netherlands had always had a somewhat less restrictive air transport policy than the rest of Europe (see Kassim 1996: 112) . In most other European countries, by contrast, national control over the airlines was deeply rooted. Although the specific models varied, most of them had very
protectionist policies of what was considered a public service sector monopoly.
Throughout Europe, the government held a majority stake or had total control of their national "flag carrier" airline.
The US experience did little to change this, even though European carriers were operating at a loss. However, it did spark the interest of EU officials and of several national officials from the more liberal member states, who wanted to apply the principles of a common market to intra-European aviation as well. The first two The 1987 package began the transfer of EC authority over EU-wide air transport service trade and set off a gradual liberalization. Under qualified majority voting introduced by the Single European Act, two further packages were adopted in July 1990 and July 1992. By April 1, 1997, the internal air transport market among the 17 states of the European Economic Area (EEA) was completed. By far the most important one, the third package transformed national carriers into "community airlines" (Mawson 1997) . It opened up all traffic rights to Community airlines, including the freedom to provide cabotage: the right to carry passengers or cargo between two points of a country which is not the home country of the airline. The system created by the EU was based on the idea of a Community license. Any airlines whose capital is held mostly by a member state or its nationals can obtain this license and has automatic access to the Community market. Within the EEA market, traffic 12 on all international routes is unrestricted and fares are no longer submitted to the national authorities for approval, although some control mechanisms persist in special instances and some public service obligations remain. Originally an international market, the EEA market resembled the US market from 1997 on. The member states did, however, retain the authority over external air service negotiations with non-EEA governments.
Member state resistance to a transfer of external competences
The European set-up after 1997 is quite paradoxical. Internally, airlines are community-licensed carriers with the right to operate out of any European country they like. Externally, however, they have to abide by the bilateral agreements that constituted part of the international regime. A British airline can offer flights between Paris and Nice, but could not fly out of France to serve an international point beyond Europe. International flight agreements continued to be negotiated by national delegations and contained the traditional ownership and control clause, which specified that they had to be national carriers. While this arrangement annoys integration-minded observers who see the limits of internal aviation integration if it was not followed by external reforms, most member state representatives felt comfortable with it and insisted on the necessity to keep external negotiation rights in the hands of the individual European states.
In fact, the Commission's quest for an external negotiation mandate in air transport dates to the beginning of internal aviation integration and had repeatedly been denied by the member states. Hence, member state resistance to a transfer of external competences was quite strong in the beginning of 2000, despite the integration of the internal market.
After 15 years of trying, the Commission's attempts to gain external competences were still unsuccessful. But the Commission had worked on several fronts and had yet another card to play: opposition to US competition. For understanding how US competition became a useful focal point for Commission activism, it is necessary to examine the recent evolution of transatlantic aviation.
A European perspective on US-led liberalization of international air transport
During the 1990s, the EU hadn't been the only one to liberalize its regional market for international aviation. The US also sought to overcome the constraints of the highly regulated international air transport regime by single-handedly reducing the complexity of bilateral agreements. shocked." 19 The proposal gained legitimacy, however, through the draft response of the Association of European Airlines, which eventually led to the TCAA proposal.
The rational behind the airlines' proposal was the need for consolidation within Europe. 20 For the Commission, the demands of AEA highlighted the incompleteness of the internal aviation market. Even though the AEA statement underlined that the EU had yet to prove the "added value" of an EC solution, the project corresponded to the interests of the European Commission and was quickly adopted as a transport Between the two communications issued by the European Commission, the Brattle Group had finished their report on an Open Aviation Area between the EU and the US (Moselle, et al. 2002) -the name had been changed to dissociate the project from the old TCAA. While addressing the main concerns of the US, the report estimated economic benefits to fall especially on the European side.
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The legal strategy and the insistence on US competition eventually paid off.
Shortly after the ECJ decision in November 2002, a representative of a liberal minded member state had still expressed their doubts about the benefits of a competence transfer.
It is not certain that we will grant a mandate for US negotiations to the EU.
We have had a series of discussions on this, but so far the Commission had not be able to clarify the value added for a competence transfer in this domain. If they can do so convincingly, we will consider their proposition, but so far we are still waiting. 
Conclusion
This article has examined the case study of international air transport in order to understand how the Commission contributes to the development of the EU's foreign policies. Instead of simply executing the external competences it has obtained from member states, the Commission also has room for maneuver which allow it to increase these competences. Similarly to Schmidt's (2000) analysis of internal market integration, the increase of external competences derives from the Commission's reliance on legal strategies. Certainly, not all legal strategies are bound to work. The
Commission's attempt to rely on its trade mandate proved unsuccessful and the administration of competition policy was only important in the integration of the internal aviation market. However, its right to start an infringement procedure, combined with a cognitive strategy of using the US as a focal point for an EU consensus ultimately led to the Council decision on June 5, 2003.
As a guardian of the Treaties, the Commission was able to create legal uncertainty about the appropriate procedure Secondly, as an arena for elaborating consensus, it had developed a very concrete proposal centered on US-EU relations, which member states were eventually willing to agree upon. The first of these two elements affected the default condition of member states; the second created a focal 23 point for rearranging the interest distribution of member states around a new stake.
Even though member states were firmly opposed to ceding sovereignty of external negotiations to the Commission, they did feel that they needed to unite in order to be able to negotiate with the US. The Commission's Open Aviation Area proposal was a suitable solution to both concerns: it provided a lesser evil and thus an acceptable answer to the legal uncertainty and helped to create a European issue identity. The mechanisms upon which the Commission can rely in its interactions with the Council of Ministers are therefore quite similar in external relations and internal integration, even though rhetoric centered on common goals and identity plays a larger role when the EU acts towards the outside.
As a single case study, this article is limited in the generalizations that can be made about other foreign policy areas. However, it is not meant as a mechanistic prediction stating that the Commission will always rely on legal or cognitive strategies to increase its external competences. Rather, it challenges the null hypothesis which assumes that this will never be the case and cautions against accounts of institutional competences in European foreign policy analysis. Studying the activism of the Commission is helpful to understand the pitfalls of delegation and to appreciate the "more varying patters of supranational autonomy" (Pollack 1997: 101) Despite variation in the particular combination of tools the Commission will use in different policy areas, understanding how the Commission can increase its competences needs to be part of an institutional analysis of EU foreign policy development. Union that specifically address issues beyond its own boundaries. They cover not just the Common Foreign and Security Policy but also areas such as trade relations and foreign economic policy, development aid, regional cooperation, enlargement, the promotion of human rights or external elements of migration policy.
2 For nuanced discussion of the principal-agent problem in EU governance and the changing relations between the Commission and the member states see Pollack (2003) and Kassim and Menon (2003) . 5 Jobert and Muller (1987) call policy frames that govern a particular sector "référentiel sectoriel" and Muller (1995) has argued that the European Union is a political space where such policy frames can be defined. This is precisely what happens in the case of international air transport. For more information, see Surel (2000) and Muller (2004) . 6 Interview in Brussels on November 26, 2002.
7 Effective ownership is defined in the US as less than 25% foreign ownership, across the EU as less than 49%. 14 While it is true that this right is little used by passenger airlines, it does facilitate cargo operation of US cargo airlines within Europe. 15 In this particular case, the US wanted to use the occasion to renegotiate its access into Heathrow airport in London. 16 Interviews with EU airline representatives on November 27 and December 2, 2002. 23 As a government representative remarks, "we have had such a difficult time negotiating by ourselves with the Americans, the EU can only be more successful."
Interview on May 20, 2003. Interestingly, the US observer put it similarly, "after all our frustration in negotiating with the British, it cannot be worse with the Commission."
24 Furthermore, actual US competition was not very threatening since American carriers were still struggling with the aftermath of September 11 th .
